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1. Introduction 
Function statements are used throughout the biological disciplines. For example, it is 
said that the function of the kidney is to extract waste products from the blood, the 
function of hemoglobin is the transportation of oxygen to tissue, and the function of 
myelin sheathing is to promote the efficient conduction of action potentials in the 
nervous system. In the case of many physical and mental disorders, it is believed that 
an inner part or process is malfunctioning or dysfunctional - such as the kidney in glo-
merulonephritis or myelin in multiple sclerosis - and knowledge of such dysfunctions 
guides medical research and intervention. Thus, functional language in biology has 
both theoretical and practical significance. 
These examples draw attention to two interesting properties that function state-
ments seem to possess. The first is that they are explanatory: to say that the function of 
myelin is to promote efficient nervous conduction is to say, roughly, why myelin is there 
or why many neural projections are sheathed in myelin. The second is that they are 
normative: the fact that the kidney, in the case of glomerulonephritis - a swelling of the 
glomeruli which filter the blood - can fail to perform its function implies that function 
statements do not necessarily describe what an entity actually does, but they set up a 
norm that specifies what that entity is supposed to do, or "what it is for." 
Explanations that purport to explain the existence, form, distribution, or location of 
an entity by referring to some future state that the entity tends to bring about are 
referred to as teleological. The term "teleological" derives from the Greek word telos, 
meaning "goal" or "end." Hence function ascriptions are often thought to be a type of 
teleological explanation. Yet functional explanations seem problematic because they 
appear to violate the principle that temporally posterior events cannot figure into causal· 
explanations for temporally prior events. The kidney must already be part of the organ-
ism in order to filter blood, just as neural projections must already be sheathed in 
myelin in order~ to efficiently conduct action potentials. How can a kidney's capacity to 
filter blood explain why the kidney is there, unless the future is assumed to have some 
causal influence over the present? (This is often called the problem of "backwards 
causation.") 
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The normative status offunction statements is also puzzling. It is perfectly clear what 
one means by saying that an artifact, such as a camera, is malfunctioning- namely, that 
it is incapable of doing what the manufacturer made it for. But what could conceivably 
be the analog of a "manufacturer" in the biological realm, unless one assumes the 
existence of a supernatural creator - an assumption commonly deemed to have no 
place in legitimate scientific explanations? In what sense is the kidney supposed to filter 
the blood, rather than to support hard calcium formations along its inner wali; or to 
do nothing? Consequently, functional explanations are not only puzzling with respect 
to what they purport to explain, but they are also suspect of violating important tenets 
of the modern scientific world view: the absence of final causes in nature and the ille-
gitimacy of appealing to divine creation or intervention. Nonetheless, they are rou-
tinely appealed to throughout the biological disciplines. This suggests that they either 
ought to be eliminated from biology or analyzed in such a way that the appeal to final 
causes or supernatural beings is shown to be unnecessary. 
One approach to the explication of function statements is simply to accept final 
causation as a distinct and irreducible type of causation. This is the solution that 
Aristotle is often thought to have provided. Aristotle's view of causation (aitia, which 
can be translated as "cause" or "reason") involves a rejection of the premise that future 
events cannot enter into explanations for the existence or form of a trait. His view i~ 
that the purpose, or telos, for which something exists cannot be eliminated from most 
biological explanations for the existence or form of a trait. (See his Physics, Book II.B 
for several central arguments for this claim; also see Parts of Animals, Book I. I for his 
defense of teleology in the context of biological explanation.) 
Of course, to say that reference to future effects cannot Be eliminated from an expla-
nation is not to say that such explanations actually refer to a distinct type of causal 
pathway. Thus, one might interpret Aristotle liberally by suggesting that he was not 
really advocating the existence of final causes that somehow bring about their own 
realization, but advocating certain constraints on the nature of good explanations 
(translating aitia as "reason," a feature of rational discourse, rather than "cause," a 
mind-independent feature of the world). This latter reading is more generous, given 
r that modern science has not accepted final causation as a distinct ontological relation. 
Consequently, supposing that functional language will not be eliminated from biology 
in the near future, any plausible account of "function" must either explain how it can 
be that the effect produced by a kind of entity can have causal relevance to the existence 
. of the entity, or dissolve the misleading appearance that function ascriptions are causal 
explanations at all. Etiological approaches to function adopt the former route; conse-
quentialist approaches the latter. 
Intuitively, one might motivate either of the two main approaches to function by 
considering the following question: what distinguishes a function of an entity from a 
mere effect that it produces? To take a hackneyed, but simple, example, why is the func-
tion of the heart to pump blood rather than to make throbbing sounds? Two different 
answers present themselves as initially plausible: 
(i) according to the etiological view, what distinguishes the function of an entity from 
a mere effect is that the capacity of the entity to perform that function explains 
"why it is there" in that system. For example, it is the capacity of windshield wipers 
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FUNCTION AND TELEOLOGY 
to remove water from windshields that explains why they are on the windshield 
of a specific car; i.e., why the manufacturers placed them there. Similarly, one 
could argue that the fact that the heart has been selected for by natural selection 
because it pumped blood explail).s why, presently, creatures with hearts exist. 
Therefore, in conformity with the logic of teleological explanations, it is true to 
say that the heart's capacity to pump blood explains why hearts currently exist. 
However, the heart was not selected for because of the beating sounds that it 
makes, so there is no sense in which the heart "is there" because of its capacity to 
make such sounds;1 
(ii) according to the consequentialist view, the function of the heart is to beat, rather 
than to make noise, because the heart's beating typically contributes to some 
important activity of the system within which it is contained, and heart sounds 
do not. In this case, beating contributes to pumping blood and this in turn to the 
survival of the organism. 'This solution corresponds to the view that the function 
of an entity consists in a (special sort of) consequence that it produces, and has 
nothing to do with the cause or origin of the item itself. 
The following is composed of two sections. Section 2 will describe the etiological (or 
"backwards-looking") approach, which rejects the premise that function statements 
refer exclusively to future events. It will enumerate the main conceptual d;mllenges 
that philosophers have confronted it with, and some of the responses to those chal-
lenges. Section 3 will describe several contemporary variants of the consequentialist 
(or "forward-looking") approach to functions, which rejects the premise that function 
ascriptions are causal explanations for the form or existence of a trait. 
2. Etiological Theories of Function 
There are two main versions of the etiological approach: one which refers to the reasons 
that motivate a purposeful being to create a functional object ("representationalism"), 
and one that refers to the natural history of the functional entity, independently of the 
notion of representation. (The latter is typically referred to as "etiological," although 
"etiologica!," properly speaking, could refer to either view.) These views will be elabo-
rated in turn. 
2.1. Representationalist theories of function 
The first version ofthe "backwards-looking" approach is standardly employed to explain 
the sense in which intelligent creatures act for the sake of the future: it is not the case 
1 There are, of course, exceptional cases in which it can be said that the heart's beating sounds 
explain why it is there. For example, if the beating sounds made by a person's heart alert a 
doctor to a life-threatening heart problem that is thereby remedied, then one can say that the 
heart sounds saved the person's life and therefore they partly explain why the person contin-
ues to exist, and hence why the heart continues to be there. Does that mean that that person's 
heart comes to have the function of making throbbing sounds? These sorts of cases will be 
described in greater detail below (see Section 2, under "The problem of overbreadth"). 
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that the future effect of one's action (e.g., health as a consequence of exercise) causes the 
person to act; rather, it is the person's mental representation ofthe future effect, together 
with her other beliefs and desires, that cause her to act as she does. Thus an indirect 
reference to the future effect is preserved within the causal explanation for the purpose-
ful action, and hence there is no violation of the normal temporal order of causation. 
To the extent that, in order for a "representation" to exist, it must exist within, or 
have been created by, a mind, then representationalist theories are also mentalistic 
(Bedau, 1990). The assumption that functions are based on mental representations 
leads to two opposing views about how entities in the natural world come to have func-
tions, the theological view and the eliminativist view (although the latter might just as 
appropriately be called the "analogical" view, for reasons that will be discussed below). 
According to the theological view- most notably advocated by Aquinas ( 1914 [ 12 69-
73])- biological entities have purposes (e.g., functions) because God make them with 
those purposes in mind. This assumption is the basis for the fifth argument for· the 
existence of God presented in his Summa Theologica (Question 2; Article 3). Roughly, 
his argument is that since mindless biological entities dearly have purposes, and some-
thing can only have a purpose if it has a mind or is controlled by something with a 
mind, then they must be controlled by something with a mind: 
We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this 
is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the 
best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their 
end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed 
by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark 
by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are 
directed to their end; and this being we call God. (Ibid., p.2 7) 
Paley's (1839 [1802]) famous design argument for the existence of God rests on a 
similar perplexity about how things that appear so well formed for a specific purpose 
could have been products of anything but intelligent design. Contemporary advocates 
of the theological view of functions include Plantinga (1993, Chapter 11) and Rea 
(2002, Chapter 5). 
Proponents of the eliminativist view also believe that functions are based on prior 
representations, and therefore if anything in nature has a function it must have been 
created for that purpose by an intelligent being. But they argue that appeals to super-
natural creation have no place in the context of scientific explanations. Therefore, to 
the extent that one accepts this stricture on scientific explanation, then one must also 
accept that biological entities do not "really" have functions (or refuse to countenance 
them in one's explanations) since they are not typically designed with purposes in 
mind. 2 Accepting this eliminativist position with respect to the existence of function 
does not, however, imply that scientists should never ascribe functions to biological 
2 To say that natural entities are "not created with purposes in mind," excludes, of course, the 
' effects of deliberate human manipulation, such as genetic engineering or artificial selection 
through breeding. Therefore, terminologically it is probably accurate to distinguish artificial 
functions and natural (rather than "biological") functions: where "natural" is intended in 
the sense of "not created or brought about by deliberate or conscious effort." 
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entities or that it is illegitimate or counterproductive to do so. They may legitimately 
do so, so long as they recognize that such usage is metaphorical (e.g., it involves exam-
ining biological forms "as if' they were created for a purpose) and that it performs a 
purely heuristic role in stimulating actual scientific theories. 
Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgement of 1789 contains the classic statement 
of this eliminativist view. Although he expresses different views on natural ends 
(Naturzweck), 3 one view that he expresses is that biological purposiveness is based on a 
prior representation: "Here I understand by absolute purposiveness [ZweckmiifJigheit] of 
natural forms such an external shape as well as inner structure that are so constituted 
that their possibility must be grounded in an idea of them in our power of judgement" 
(2000 [1789], p.20; see Section VI of first introduction). In the case of natural ends, 
then, teleology presupposes the existence of a mind that can represent biological forms 
prior to creating them. Such a postulate, however, cannot enter into a causal explana-
tion for the existence. of such traits, since one of the a priori constraints on causal 
explanation is that both cause and effect must themselves be objects of the natural 
world. Causality cannot be a relation between the supernatural and the natural world, 
so long as one is operating within the perspective of natural science, since such a rela-
tion is not a possible object of experience: "But purposiveness in nature, as well as the 
concept of things as natural ends, places reason as cause into a relation with such 
things, as the ground of their possibility, in a way which we cannot know through any 
experience" (ibid., p.35; see Section IX of. first introduction). Therefore, a function 
ascription has the status of a heuristic device for scientific research, or what Kant refers 
calls a regulative, rather than constitutive, principle: it can guide the formation of sci-
entific hypotheses or the discovery of new evidence but it does not enter into the content 
of those hypotheses or the evidential statements (ibid., p.37; also see§ 61). 
A similar representationalist view, according to which the ascription of functions to 
the natural world rests upon an analogy to conscious design, is also adopted by the 
emergentist C. D. Broad (1925, p.82), and it finds more contemporary adherents in 
Woodfield (1976), Schaffner (1993, pp.403-4), Nissen (1997), and Ruse (1989, 
p.152). See Bedau (1990) for a critique of mentalistic views. 
It was noted above that representationalist theories of function are almost always 
construed as mentalistic theories. Can there also be non-mentalistic representational 
theories of function, where representation is analyzed without appeal to minds? A 
possible such theory is associated with the distinction between "teleology" and 
"teleonomy." The term "teleonomy" was coined by the evolutionary biologistPittendrigh 
(1958, p.394), to refer to systems that are in some sense "end-directed," but where this 
end-directedness does not rely on the problematic metaphysical assumptions associated 
with the word "teleology" -those of final causation or divine creation. However, he 
does not explicate his use of "end-directedness" or "goals." Mayr (1961, 1974), there-
fore, should primarily be credited with developing the concept of "teleonomy." 
According to Mayr, a process or behavior is "teleonomic" if it is controlled by an 
internal "program" (1974, p.98). He defines a "program," in turn, as "coded or prear-
3 The following is a very partial account of Kant's view, and neglects his important phenom-
enological descriptions of the self-organization of living matter (e.g., §65), a phenomenon 
that he believes to warrant teleological explanation. 
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ranged information that controls a process (or behavior) leading it toward a given end" 
(ibid., p.l02). Clearly, Mayr's analysis does not eliminate appeal to teleological con-
cepts- such as "being led toward an end." Nonetheless, it does not seem implausible 
to suggest that the operative concept behind his formulation, like that of the mentalis-
tic view, is that of "representation"- insofar as saying that one thing "carries informa-
tion about" another thing seems tantamount to saying. that the first thing represents 
the second. If this is true, then a teleonomic process might be equivalent to one that 
tends to develop along a specific trajectory, or into a specific form, by virtue of the fact 
that it is controlled, in part, by a non-mentalistic representation of that trajectory or 
form. Moreover, he clearly intends that segments of DNA that have been retained by 
natural selection, as well as neural structures that are shaped in some appropriate way 
by experience, qualify as containing "coded information." Hence, his analysis would 
require a naturalistic explication of "information" or "representation" that is appropri-
ate for the biological context and that picks out the structures in question. 
The feasibility of providing a naturalistic explication of biological information is 
defended by Maynard-Smith (2000), Sarkar (2000), and Sterelny (2000), as well as in 
the context of the "teleosemantic" account of information developed by, e.g., Stampe 
(1977), Enc (1982), and Millikan (1984) [SEE BIOLOGICAL INFORMATION]. However, 
most of the analyses depend centrally upon the concept of "function," and conse-
quently cannot be used as part of an explication of "function" itself. The problem of 
defining a concept of "representation" that does not appeal to "function" is that repre-
sentation, lil<e function, is often assumed to be a normative concept. In other words, a 
representation can misrepresent something, just as a part of a system can malfunction 
(Millikan, 1984, p.l7; Dretske, 1986). Hence it is sometimes suggested that the concept 
of function can be used to explicate the concept of representation, since it may be pos-
sible to explain the normative nature of representations by assuming that they have 
functions. A "misrepresentation," on this account, would be something like a sign that 
fails to perform its function. Moreover, since functions seem to be much more wide-
spread in nature than representations (the heart has the function of pumping blood 
without being a representation of anything, whereas, plausibly, most representations 
have the function of guiding behavior), then defining representation in terms of func-
tion seems more likely to succeed than defining function in terms of representation. 
2.2. Non-representationalist theories of function 
Whereas representationalist views resolve the problem of backwards causation by 
seeking the origin of the functional entity in a prior mental representation, non-
representationalist views seek to explain why such entities currently exist by appeal to 
entities of the same type that existed in the past and that, by virtue of producing the 
effect in question, were able to persist over time or to reproduce their kind. On this view, 
the function of an entity is that effect that entities of its kind produced in the past, 
which, in turn, contributed to the persistence or reproduction of that entity or type of 
entity. Thus, non-representationalist theories solve the problem" of backwards causa-
tion by invoking a cyclical dimension: X did Y at time t0 , and as a consequence, X was 
able to continue to do Y, or X, by virtue of doing Y, was able to produce entities of the 
same type as X at time t1. Such cyclical modes of production are sometimes referred to 
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as "consequence-etiologies" (Wright, 1976, p.ll6), because one of the consequences 
that the functional item produces figures into an etiological account of why it continues 
to exist at a later time. 
The most obvious example of a process that generates consequence-etiologies is 
natural selection, since the reproduction of heritable traits that have higher relative 
fitness than alternate traits explains the maintenance ofthe former within a population 
of reproducing entities. Several biologists throughout the twentieth century drew 
attention to the connection between teleological statements and natural selection, and 
stated explicitly that the existence of natural selection can justify the use of teleology 
in biology.4 Perhaps the earliest reference comes from the neuroscientist Charles 
Sherrington, in his The Integrative Action of the Nervous System (1906). In that work, 
Sherrington pauses to reflect on his oft-repeated use of teleological terms such as 
"purpose," and his considerations suggest strongly that he identifies the purpose of a 
reflex with what it was selected for: 
That a reflex action should exhibit purpose is no longer considered evidence that a psychi-
cal process attaches to it; let alone that it represents any dictate of "choice" or "will." In 
light of the Darwinian theory every reflex must be purposive. We here trench upon a kind 
of teleology ... The purpose of a reflex seems as legitimate and urgent an object for natural 
inquiry as the purpose of the colouring of an insect or a blossom. (Ibid., pp.235-6) 
The ethologist Konrad Lorenz makes a similar remark in his 1963 book, On 
Aggression: 
If we ask "What does a cat have sharp, curved claws for?" and answer simply "To catch 
mice with," this does not imply a profession of any mythical teleology, but the plain state-
ment that catching mice is the function whose survival value, by the process of natural 
selection, has bred cats with this particular form of claw. Unless selection is at work, the 
question "What for?" cannot receive an answer with any real meaning. (Lorenz, 1966 
[1963], pp.l3-4; cited in Griffiths, 1993, p.412) 
The evolutionary biologist George Williams also emphasizes this p0int: "The designa-
tion of something as the means or mechanism for a certain goal or function or purpose will 
imply that the machinery involved was fashioned by selection for the goal attributed 
to it" (1966, p.9).5 
None of these accounts, however, state why explanations based on natural selection 
fit the pattern of teleological explanations-they simply express, as it were, the basic 
intuition that they do, without articulating a rationale. Perhaps the first attempt to 
explicitly justify this view is found in the work of the evolutionary biologist Ayala 
(1968, p.217; 1970, pp.40-1), who points out that in a selectionist explanation, an 
4 Lennox (1993) argues that Darwin himself implicitly uses teleological terms such as "end" 
and "purpose" to describe the outcome of selection processes (ibid., p.41 5), though Darwin 
never explicitly states this fact about his usage. 
5 It is ironic that the etiological theory was primarily developed by biologists, since one of the 
main arguments against the etiological analysis is that it does not correspond to actual bio-
logical usage! (See Section 3). 
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effect that an entity produces figures into an explanation of why that type of entity 
currently exists, and this, by definition, constitutes a teleological explanation. Wimsatt 
( 19 7 2) provides a comprehensive philosophical analysis of the logical structure of func-
tion statements and argues that insofar as function statements are construed as teleo-
logical explanations, selection processes are the only known and plausible way in 
which such statements can be justified: "(T]he operation of selection processes is not 
only not special to biology, but appears to be at the core of teleology and purposeful 
activity wherever they occur" (ibid., p.l3).6 More famously, Wright (1973, p.161; also 
see Wright, 1972) defines "function" in terms of these consequence-etiologies and 
argues that natural selection can justify function statements (Wright, 1973, p.159). 7 
Several different theories of function stem from this basic insight, and much of the 
philosophical literature on functions consists in the attempt to ramify, extend, and 
qualify this viewpoint. Three major challenges to this etiological view, and some of the 
responses to these challenges, will be presented in order to elucidate the ways in which 
the position has been developed over time. 
(i) The problem of overbreadth. The first problem can be understood as a response to 
Wright's (1973) influential view, although in some form or another it continues to 
plague etiological theories. According to Wright's explication: 
The function of X is Z means 
(a) X is there because it does Z, 
(b) Zis a consequence (or result) of X's being there. (1973, p.161) 
In the artifact context, X's form can be explained by the fact that somebody recognized 
that form to have a certain capacity (Z), and produced it for that reason, thereby fulfill-
ing the first premise. In the biological context, if X was selected for by virtue of one of 
its effects, Z, and this selection process partly accounts for its present existence, then it 
will be true to say that "X is there because it does Z," thereby also satisfying the first 
premise. If X' s being there allows it to continue to do Z, then the second will be fulfilled 
as well. Clearly, the purpose of Wright's fairly general analysis is to present the idea of 
a cyclical causal process, one that incorporates both natural and artifact functions. 
But Wright's general definition is also satisfied by processes that, intuitively, one 
would not want to ascribe functions to, such as the sort contrived by Boorse ( 19 7 6) in 
his critique of Wright. Suppose, for example, that a hose in a laboratory springs a leak, 
and thereby emits a noxious chemical, and any scientist that attempts to seal the hose 
gets knocked unconscious by the chemical it emits. Thus it can be said that the leak in 
the hose contributes to its own persistence by knocking out anyone that comes close 
enough to fix it (ibid., p.72). But it seems counterintuitive to say that knocking out 
scientists is the function of the leak, or that the leak has any function at all. Similarly, 
obesity can contribute to a sedentary lifestyle, which in turn can reinforce obesity. Thus 
6 However, he hesitates to build this insight into a conceptual analysis of"function," since he comes 
up with counter-examples that purport to show that being selected for is, strictly speaking, 
neither necessary nor sufficient for having a teleological function (Wimsatt, 19 72, pp.15-16 ). 
7 Wright (1973), like Wimsatt (1972), does not define "function" ex\)\ic\.t\:~ \.n. te1:ms o~ se\ec-
t\.ml, b\lt dffi.ID."S tnat \laving been selected for, in fact, suffices for having a function. 
532 
I 
• a 
FUNCTION AND TELEOLOGY 
it is possible to explain a person's current obesity in terms of one of the consequences 
his or her obesity produced in the past that contributes to its own persistence (ibid., 
pp.75-6). Yet, like the hose example, it is seems bizarre to suggest that the function of 
obesity is to contribute to a sedentary lifestyle. 8 
Boorse's counterexamples have been influential in shaping the development and 
refinement of etiological theories of function, since they have led many to accept that 
having been selected for by natural selection, rather than merely having contributed 
to the continuation of one's present state, is a necessary condition for having a function 
(see, e.g., Neander, 1983, p.103; Millikan, 1993, pp.34- 6; Boorse himself (1976, 
p.76) raises this possibility but rejects it). This view will be referred to as the "selected 
effects" (SE) theory of function, and some version of it is probably the most widely held 
theory of function amongst philosophers (Neander, 1983, 1991; Millikan, 1984, 
l989a, 1989b, 1993; Brandon, 1990; Griffiths, 1992, 1993; Godfrey-Smith, 1994; 
Mitchell, 1993, 1995; Allen & Bekoff, 1995a, 1995b). Obesity, though it secures its 
own persistence by contributing to a sedentary lifestyle, is in no sense selected over some 
other phenotypic trait because it contributes to a sedentary lifestyle. Similarly, the leak 
in the hose is not there because it, rather than something else, proved to be more effec-
tive in knocking out scientists. This also resolves the problem, noted earlier (fn. 2), of 
the function of heart sounds - since even if the heart's beating sounds help to protect 
the heart by alerting physicians to potential heart problems, the heart was not selected 
for because it makes these sounds. However, by introducing natural selection as a 
necessary condition on function ascriptions, Wright's theory loses some of its general-
ity, and this is the basis for the second criticism. 
(ii) The problem of conceptual divergence. The problem of conceptual divergence has 
two forms. First of all, it is not clear how theSE theory of function adequately explains 
the functions of artifacts, and hence it entails the existence of a conceptual divergence 
between artifact "functions" and biological "functions" that is not intuitively obvious. 
Certainly, some types of artifacts undergo a certain selection process, where, over a 
significant period of time, certain features of its form are replicated, others are modified, 
and still others are extinguished. Nonetheless, functions are typically ascribed to arti-
facts on their first appearance, and that is because the intention of the designer suffices· 
to give an artifact its function. It does not seem that this can be reconciled with the 
SE view. 
Some philosophers have attempted to lessen this discrepancy by suggesting that the 
process of designing an artifact is akin to natural selection, in that the designer typically 
imagines variations on a given form, and chooses to actualize only that one that is most 
suitable to his or her purposes. Hence a type of "virtual" selection process takes place 
(Wimsatt, 1972; Griffiths, 1993). For example, Wimsatt (1972, p.15) raises the pos-
sibility of !'mental trial and error" in his attempt to assimilate artifact functions to his 
model of biological functions, and show that some concept of selection over a range of 
8 Bedau (1992, p.786) uses the example of a stick floating down a stream that brushes against 
a rock and gets pinned there by the backwash it creates, and thus is responsible for perpetu-
ating its current position, to make the same point. Clearly, such examples can be multiplied 
indefinitely. 
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alternatives underlies both. 9 Another response has been to deny that an accurate expli-
cation of the concept of "biological function" must also account for the functions of 
artifacts (e.g., Godfrey-Smith, 1993, p.347). Perhaps the intuition that there exists a 
unified concept of function merely reflects the persistence of the "dead metaphor" that 
biological forms are the product of design (Lewens, 2004, p.13). 
Regardless of whether or not the SE theory can successfully assimilate artifact func-
tions, its generality appears to be quite limited in a second way, namely, historically. 
Harvey, for example, discovered that the function of the heart is to circulate the blood, 
and he believed that he discovered its function: "it is absolutely necessary to conclude 
that the blood in the animal body is impelled in a circle, and is in a state of ceaseless 
movement; that this is the act or function which the heart performs by means of its 
pulse; and that it is the sole and only end of the movement and contraction of the heart" 
(Harvey, 1894 [1628], p.72). But he did not possess the theory of natural selection. 
Therefore, if the SE view is accurate, then Harvey meant something altogether different 
when he spoke of the function of the heart than what modern biologists mean (Frankfurt 
& Poole, 1966, p.71; Boorse, 1976, p.74; Nagel, 1977, p.284; Enc, 1979, p.346). 
One response has been to argue that the SE theory is only intended to be accurate 
as a conceptual analysis of modern biological usage (Neander, 1991, p.176), regardless 
of whether it captures lay or historical usage. It has also been argued that the goal of 
explicating "function" is not to provide a conceptual analysis at all, but rather, a theo-
retical definition of "function" (Millikan, 1989b, p.293), in the same way that being 
H20 constitutes a theoretical definition of "water." But since theoretical definitions are 
themselves often tantamount to conceptual analyses of modern scientific usage, the 
two responses are similar. Schwartz (2004) goes further by emphasizing the stipulative 
and constructive roles of philosophical definitions of "function," arguing that such 
definitions constitute explications of biological usage, rather than conceptual analyses 
or theoretical definitions. According to Carnap (1950, see chapters 1 and 2), philo-
sophical explication involves the replacement of a vague concept by a precise one, and 
hence it often entails making distinctions that did not previously exist in the scientific 
context in question. It has the character of a proposal, to be accepted or rejected on 
pragmatic grounds. 
The attempt to justify the SE view by appealing to modern biological usage gives rise 
, to a different problem, which is that modern biologists don't always, or even typically, 
use "function" with any etiological import (Amundson & Lauder, 1994; Godfrey-Smith, 
1994, p.351; Walsh, 1996, p.558; Schlosser, 1998, p.304; Wouters, 2003, p.658; 
Sarkar, 2005, p.18; Griffiths, 2005). Although, as noted above, biologists sometimes 
do use "function" more or less synonymously with "adaptation," in many contexts 
, "function" is tied more closely to the current survival value of a trait. For example, as 
Godfrey-Smith (1994, p.351) points out, according to an influential set of distinctions 
introduced by Tinbergen (1963), the field of behavioral ethology is largely concerned 
with four questions concerning behavior: its (proximate) causation, its survival value, 
9 However, he also entertains the possibility that an omniscient being, if one exists, might 
never have to consider a range of alternatives before acting, and yet the actions would none-
theless be purposeful - and thus that it is conceivable that the actions of this being could be 
explained teleologically without being the product of a selection process! 
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FUNCTION AND TELEOLOGY 
its evolution, and its ontogeny (ibid., p.411). In Tinbergen's usage, "survival value" is 
synonymous with "function," and explicitly separated from the question of evolution, 
and in particular, from the selective history of a behavior (ibid., p.423). Mayr (1961), 
similarly, distinguishes "functional biology" and "evolutionary biology," arguing that 
the former is concerned with the realm of "proximate causes" and the latter, "ultimate 
causes" of an entity or process, whereas, according to SE, "function" describes only the 
realm of ultimate causes. 
Even more broadly, "function" is often used to characterize the entire range of 
activities that a part of a system is capable of performing (e.g., the sense in which "func-
tion" is opposed to structure). For example, the evolutionary morphologists Bock and 
Von Walbert (1965, p.2 74) define the function of an entity simply as "all physical and 
chemical properties arising from its form," provided that these properties are not rela-
tive to the environment, and Amundson and Lauder (1994) argue that this more 
liberal usage is standard in anatomy, comparative morphology, and physiology. This 
makes the use of function statements in those disciplines heavily dependent upon the 
interests of the investigator, since without at least imposing a pragmatic restriction on 
the appropriate use of function statements, virtually every structure in the natural 
world can be said to possess a "function." Given these multiple salient uses within 
biology, the most reasonable attitude to adopt seems to be a pluralistic one 
(e.g., Millikan, 1989a; Kitcher, 1993; Godfrey-Smith, 1994; Amundson & Lauder, 
1994). 
(iii) The problem of vestiges. A third criticism is that SE does not seem to allow for the 
possibility of vestiges, which are traits such as the human appendix which once pos-
sessed functions but have ceased to perform them for so long that they are said to be 
functionless (Boorse, 1976, p.76; Prior, 1985). The rudimentary ocular cyst of the 
cave-dwelling fish, Phreatichthys andruzzii, is not a dysfunctional eye, but a functionless 
vestige - even though at some point the organ had been selected for because of sight. 
But if the vestigial trait had ever been selected for, however distantly in the past, then 
its past contribution to the fitness of ancestral organisms figures into a complete expla-
nation for its present persistence in the population. Therefore, without imposing any 
temporal restrictions on the explication of "function," it is not cle~r how that explica-
tion can capture the idea that a heritable trait, though it once possessed a function, no 
longer does, but has been retained because, e.g., the relevant mutations that would 
have allowed it to atrophy or be replaced never arose. 
Another case which supports -the need for introducing temporal restrictions on func-
tion ascriptions is the case of functional co-optation, in which a trait that initially 
spread within a population by selection for one of its consequences eventually came to 
be maintained by selection for something else, or in which a trait that was initially not 
selected for at all came to be selected for in a new environment. This distinction partly 
overlaps Gould and Vrba's (1982) well-known distinction between adaptation and 
exaptation, where a trait is an adaptation if it was "built by selection for its current role 
(ibid., p.6)," and an exaptation if it was later "co-opted" for a useful role that it was not 
originally selected for. For example, plant species of the genus Dalechampia probably 
first used resin secretions as a defense against herbivores; later, they became used as a 
reward system for pollinators (Armbruster, 1997). Exaptations are ubiquitous in the 
biological realm and render problematic any simplistic attempt to infer the selective 
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history of a trait from its current contribution to fitness. SE must possess the resources 
to conceptualize such transitions appropriately. 
Perhaps the most widely accepted etiological approach is that which identifies the 
function of a trait with the effect for which it was selected in the recent evolutionary past 
(Griffiths, 1992, 1993; Godfrey-Smith, 1994). But how should such a temporal unit 
be defined? Griffiths ( 19 9 2) defends a version of SE according to which the trait in ques-
tion must have contributed to its maintenance in a population during the last "evolu-
tionary significant time period" for that trait, and he defines an evolutionarily significant 
time period for a trait, T, as that time period during which, given the mutation rate at 
the loci controlling T, and the population size, one would have expected some regres-
sion (atrophy) of T were it not making some contribution to fitness (ibid., p.l28). 
Godfrey-Smith (1994), while introducing the expression "modern history theory of 
functions," leaves the determination of such a unit implicit. 
Two other important developments within the structure of etiological views are 
worth noting before describing consequentialist views. The first is a distinction between 
"function" and "design," the importance of which is argued for in Allen and Bekoff 
(1995a, 1995b; also see Kitcher, 1993 and Buller, 2002, who elaborate notions of 
"design" in relation to which functions are identified). Unlike the concept of function, 
which can be used broadly to encompass whatever a trait was selected for, the concept 
of design, they claim, should only be applied to that subset of functions that partly 
explain the structural modification of a trait over time (1995a, p.615). They point out 
that what something is an "adaptation" for (in Gould and Vrba's sense) is often what 
it is "designed" for, and that "exaptations" will often correspond to traits which merely 
have "functions" but were not designed, since they did not undergo any additional 
structural modification to perform the exapted function. 10 
A second distinction that is useful is that between the "strong" etiological theory and 
the "weak" etiological theory, which has been implicit in much of the literature but only 
articulated by Buller (1988, 2002). According to the strong etiological theory, a func-
tion of a trait is an effect that, in the past, the trait was selected for (hence it is identical to 
SE). According to the weak etiological theory, however, the function of a trait is an effect 
that, in the past, contributed to the fitness ofits bearer and thereby contributed to its own 
reproduction, regardless of whether it was selected for-that is, regardless of whether the 
requisite variation existed upon which selection could act, or whether existing variation 
was correlated with differential reproduction. Another way of formulating the distinc-
tion is that the strong etiological theory emphasizes the contribution of a trait to differen-
tial reproduction; the weak etiological theory emphasizes reproduction as such. Both 
theories, clearly, only ascribe functions to heritable traits. 11 
A simple example drawn from Dover (2000, p.41) can help to clarify the distinction. 
Suppose that.._in a small population, genetic drift carries an allele to fixation at t0 • 
10 See Buller (2002), however, who argues that their distinction between "function" and 
"design" is unprincipled, because whether something is designed for X, or merely has the 
function of performing X, often depends upon purely conventional decisions about how selec-
tion pressures should be individuated. 
11 Buller (2002, pp.230-3) points out that it is not uncommon for philosophers to vacillate 
between the two forms. 
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FUNCTION AND TELEOLOGY 
Although that allele has a phenotypic effect, it did not confer any fitness advantage on 
its possessors. Now suppose that, at t1, the environment changes in such a way that pos-
session of the allele is necessary for survival. Even though all of the individuals within the 
population have the allele- so there is no selection for it- they all would have perished 
at t1 had any of the alternate alleles gone to fixation at t0• Thus, at t2 , it can be said that 
one of the reasons that the allele currently exists is because it produces the effect in ques-
tion. Consequently, the scenario satisfies the pattern of teleological explanation. But 
since selection did not enter the scenario, the strong etiological theory does not bestow a 
function upon the trait, since at t1 , the requisite variation did not exist upon which selec-
tion could act, and at to, the differential reproduction of alleles was not correlated with 
differential fitness. Hence, the weak etiological theory is clearly more liberal with respect 
to the range of evolutionary mechanisms that it considers function bestowing, yet it still 
permits teleological explanation. Finally, since it only ascribes functions to heritable 
traits, it avoids the Boorse-style counterexamples described earlier. 
3. Consequentialist Theories of Function 
Despite the plurality of etiological theories, and despite the attempts to render etiologi-
cal theories more consistent with modern biological usage, it is often pointed out that 
typically, when biologists seek to determine the function of an entity, they look to some 
subset of current dispositions or capacities of that entity rather than to the fossil record. 
This suggests that despite the modifications that can be imposed on the etiological 
theory to render it more compatible with biological usage, it does not adequately 
capture that usage. Thus, some argue, functions, whatever else they may be, must be 
thought of as current dispositions or consequences of traits, and hence function ascrip-
tions cannot provide causal explanations for the current maintenance of a trait in a 
population. As noted above, consequentialist theories of function almost invariably 
conceive of the function of an entity as consisting in its contribution to something else, 
or its disposition to so contribute. Insofar as functions, in the qiological context, are 
typically ascribed only to parts of systems (rather than to the system as a whole), then 
according to consequentialist theories the function of a trait is typically thought to 
·consist in its contribution to some property or capacity of a more inclusive system- e.g., 
the contribution of a trait to the fitness of the organism. Hence, in the following, con-
sequentialist theories will be classified according to the sort of systemic property 
or capacity which performance of the function contributes to bringing about or main-
taining.12 In the following, four types of contribution theories will be described: 
12 It is not always the case that consequentialist theories define the function of an entity in terms 
ofits contribution to something else. As noted above, according to one liberal biological concep-
tion of function, the function of a structure consists of the totality of effects it produces. indepen-
dently of reference to the environment (Bock & von Wahlert, 196 5, p.2 7 4). In this theory there 
is no sense in which a function contributes to anything else, much less a containing system. By 
the same token, it is not always the case that when a functional entity does contribute to a 
system, that system is its own inclusive system. This is most obviously true in the case of arti-
facts, which are typically not "part" of the person who uses them (see Wright, 1973, p.145). 
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interest-contribution theories; goal-contribution theories; good-contribution theories; 
and fitness-contribution theories. 
3. 1. Interest-contribution theories 
The most general contribution theory is the interest-contribution theory, according to 
which the function of an entity consists, roughly, in its contribution to bringing a~out 
or maintaining some property of a system that is of interest to an investigator. The 
most well-known proponent of this theory is Cummins (1975; also see 2002)- so well 
known, in fact, that such functions are often simply referred to as "Cummins functions" 
(Millikan, 19 8 9a; Godfrey-Smith, 19 9 3 ), or even "C-functions" (Walsh & Ariew, 19 9 6). 
However, as will be elaborated below, Cummins' own view could be appropriately 
referred to as the "systemic capacity" view, because it restricts functions to the compo-
nents of complex and hierarchically organized systems. 
Cummins ( 19 7 5) claims that most prior analyses of "function" were flawed because 
they overldoked the fact that functions refer primarily to a distinctive style of explana-
tion ("functional analysis"), and only secondarily to a distinctive object of study (e.g .. 
organismic fitness) (ibid., p.756). In keeping with this methodological approach, to 
ascribe a function to a part of a system is to ascribe a capacity to that part, and this 
capacity is picked out because it plays a salient role in an analytical account of a capac-
ity of the system itself. In this sense, there is nothing mysterious about function ascrip-
tions, since they do not imply that an effect of a trait explains that trait's existence; 
rather. they merely show how a trait produces the effect in question. This analytical 
strategy constitutes a special style of scientific explanation, however, because it explains 
a complex capacity of a system by drawing attention to the simpler capacities of its 
subsystems and showing how they are organized in such a way as to yield the complex 
capacity. The more complex the capacity under investigation, the more complex the 
organization of the system, and the simpler the subsystem capacities, the more interest-
ing such an explanation is. Nonetheless, the appropriateness of function statements is 
always relative to someone's explanatory interest, even if such ascriptions are not 
particularly interesting. 
Hempel (1965 [1959]) and Lehman (1965) appear to hold an early version of the 
interest-based view. According to Hempel. the function of a system part consists, 
roughly, in its contribution to fulfilling some condition which is necessary for the 
"adequate, or effective. or proper working' order" of the system as a whole (ibid., p.306). 
Hempel. however, does not attempt a definition of "proper working order"; his view is 
that each scientific discipline that uses function statements. whether it be biology, 
psychology, or sociology, must operationalize the notion of "proper working order" ill 
its own terms, and hence his concept of function is explicitly relativized to the explan-
atory and disciplinary context at hand (ibid., pp.321-2). Similar views that emphasize 
the explanatory or pragmatic context of function statements are held by Prior (1985), 
Amundson and Lauder (1994), Hardcastle (1999), Davies (2001), and Craver 
(2001). 
Because of the fact that, according to these views, functions are only limited by the 
interests- epistemic or pragmatic- of the investigator, they are often accused of over-
breadth. On the one hand, "functions" could be ascribed throughout the non-organic 
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FUNCTION AND TELEOLOGY 
world. For example, a particular arrangement of rocks can have the "function" of con-
tributing the widening of a river delta downstream from it (Kitcher, 1993, p.390), and 
clouds can have the function of promoting vegetation growth (Millikan, 19 8 9b, p.2 94 ). 
On the other hand, functions can be applied to entities that are clearly malfunctioning 
or maladaptive; as Cummins himself points out, the appendix keeps people vulnerable 
to appendicitis but it sounds strange to call this one of its functions (Cummins, 1975, 
p.752)- even though medical researchers are clearly interested in providing an ana-
lytical account of how this takes place! Yet these criticisms seem to misconstrue 
Cummins' insistence on the methodological, rather than substantive, character of 
functional analysis. Certainly, if, on the systemic capacity theory, function ascriptions 
were primarily intended to perform the substantive role of delineating a special type of 
system, then the liberality objection would be well taken, since such ascriptions would 
be vacuous. But since functional analysis is held to mark a style of explanation, then 
the liberality objection does not hold- it would be tantamount to suggesting that "con-
ceptual analysis" is too liberal because, in principle, it applies to any concept! 
3.2. Goal-contribution theories 
' According to goal-contribution theories, the function of a part of a system consists in 
its contribution to a goal of that system. The notion of a "goal" or of a "goal-directed 
system" occupied a significant place in philosophical approaches to teleology from the 
1940s through the early 1970s (Rosenblueth et al., 1943; Sommerhoff, 1950, 1969; 
Braithwaite, 1953; Nagel, 1953, 1961; Beckner, 1969; Manier, 1971). However, it 
largely fell out of favor among philosophers of biology in the early 19 70s, partly owing 
to the predominance of evolutionary considerations within that tradition and partly 
owing to internal conceptual shortcomings (Wimsatt, 1972; Ruse, 1973; Hull, 1973). 
In short, a goal-directed system is one that exhibits a capacity to attain a specific value 
for some system variable, or to maintain the variable within a range of values, in the 
face of environmental perturbation, via the existence of compensatory activity operat-
ing amongst the system's parts. The maintenance or attainment of a given value for 
the system variable is considered the goal of the system, and the specific contribution 
of a part of the system to that goal is considered to be the function of that part (Boorse, 
1976, p.77; Nagel, 1977, p.297). Thus any system may have several goals; addition-
ally, any sufficiently complex system can be analyzed as a hierarchy of goal-directed 
systems. Boorse (1976, 2002) advocates a goal-contribution theory and claims that 
individual survival and reproduction constitute the "apical goals" of the organism 
(2002, p.76); hence his general theory of function is largely coextensive with the 
fitness-contribution view when instantiated in the biological context. 
Two paradigmatic cases of"natural" or "mechanical" purposiveness largely inspired 
this approach to teleology: homeostatic mechanisms drawn from physiology and ser-
vomechanisms that constitute the subject matter of cybernetics. As an example of the 
first type of mechanism, the percentage of water in the blood remains at around 90 
percent throughout an individual's lifetime. This is because if it drops far below this 
level, the muscles increase the rate at which they infuse the blood with water; if it rises 
far above this level, the kidneys increase the rate at which they extract water from the 
blood. In this manner, the constancy of the water level of the blood is not a static 
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phenomenon; it is actively maintained via compensatory mechanisms that operate 
throughout the body in the face of perturbation. Servomechanisms, such as heat-
seeking missiles, exhibit a similar capacity to actively maintain a specific trajectory in 
the face of perturbation, and to adapt that trajectory to the moving position of the 
target. The oft-repeated slogan that goal-directed systems exhibit "plasticity" and "per-
sistence" (e.g., Nagel, 1977, p.272; Enc & Adams, 1992, p.650) captures two central 
features of the concept of goal-directedness. On the one hand, such systems exhibit 
plasticity in that the same effect can be reached from a number of initial systemic con-
figurations and by virtue of a number of different mechanisms or pathways. On the 
other hand, such systems persist in their course of action to the extent that they 
have the ability to attain or maintain a course of action in the face of environmental 
perturbation. 13 
Since negative feedback systems are capable of exhibiting self-regulation, the concept 
of goal-directedness has often been analyzed narrowly in terms of negative feedback 
(Rosenbleuth et al., 1943; Manier, 1971; Adams, 1979; Faber, 1984; but see Wimsatt, 
19 71, for criticism of the concept of "feedback"). However, theories of goal-directedness 
that emphasize the compensatory and self-regulatory activity of systems are not neces-
sarily tied to negative feedback. Hull (1973) points out that a system can exhibit the 
plasticity required to be goal-directed without being guided by negative feedback. For 
example, if the kidney does not succeed in ridding the body of excess water, then sweat-
ing may do so, but the different responses are not clearly regulated by a single negative 
feedback system (ibid., pp.llQ-11). (Nagel, 1953, p.211, Sommerhoff, 1969, pp.198-
9, and Schlosser, 199 8, p. 309 also point out limitations of the negative feedback model 
for analyzing goal-directedness.) 
Recently, Schlosser (1998) adopted some of the basic insights from the goal-
supporting theory while rejecting its association with negative feedback (ibid., 
p.309)- although, strictly speaking, his theory should not be conflated with a goal-
. contribution view. According to his view, if a state or property of a system has a func-
tion then there exists a set of circumstances under which it is necessary for its own 
"reproduction" - that is, its trans-generational reproduction or intra-generational 
persistence (ibid., p.326). However, in order to avoid the Boorse-type counterexamples 
described above, he stipulates that the system in question must be capable of com-
plex self-reproduction-that is, the system must be capable of reproducing the state 
in different ways, depending upon the environmental circumstances (ibid., p.312). 
Hence his view incorporates the plasticity criterion associated with goal-supporting 
theories while leaving fairly open the mechanisms by which this plasticity is realized. 
Two main problems affiict goal-contribution theories, the "problem of vacuousness" 
and the "problem of goal-failure." The problem of vacuousness stems from the fact that 
the standard characterization of a goal-directed system as one that exhibits "plasticity 
13 It is sometimes argued that the goal-supporting account does not allow one to determine a 
system goal, and consequently, that this goal must be arbitrarily stipulated (Wimsatt, 1972, 
pp.20-2; Schaffner, 1993, pp.367-8; Schlosser, 1998, p.327). However, the above examples 
show this claim to be inaccurate. In the homeostatic case, that maintaining the water content of 
the blood at around 90% qualifies as a "goal" of the system is a consequence of the definition of 
"goal" and a rudimentary understanding of physiology, and need not be arbitrarily stipulated. 
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FUNCTION AND TELEOLOGY 
and persistence" with respect to a given end is not sufficient for imposing a substantive 
distinction between different types of systems, for almost all systems can be described 
as seeking an equilibrium state which can be reached from different initial states and 
in different ways (Wimsatt, 1971; Woodfield, 1976; Nissen, 1980-1; Bedau, 1993). A 
pendulum swinging to a state of rest, a ball rolling from the top of a bowl to the bottom, 
and an elastic solid returning to its original condition after the imposition of tension 
would all represent goal-directed systems. Consequently, unless one specific mecha-
nism, such as negative feedback, is included within the definition, it is difficult to 
exclude such counterexamples. Sommerhoff (1950, p.86), and Nagel (1977, p.273), 
attempt to exclude such systems by imposing an independence condition on the vari-
ables, which roughly states that all of the controlling variables must be independently 
manipulable. 
The problem of goal-Jailure stems from the fact that most explications of goal-
directedness have tacitly or explicitly assumed that the supposed goal-directed behavior 
is successful, and as a consequence it is not clear how to explain the intuition that a 
non-conscious entity can have a goal and yet fail to satisfy it (Scheffler, 19 59; Beckner, 
' 1959; Hull, 1973). Manier (1971, p.234) and Adams (1979, p.S06) address this 
problem by arguing that what makes a negative feedback system "goal-directed" is not 
that it actually achieves its goal, but that it is governed by an internal representation 
of the goal-state. (This brings the goal-contribution theory closer to an etiological 
theory such as Mayr's (1961, 1974), as described above.) This, however, raises the 
~ additional onus of providing a naturalistic account of "representation" that does not 
itself appeal to function. 
3. 3. Good-contribution theories 
The core idea behind good-contribution theories of function is that in order for an entity 
to possess a function, performance of that function must (usually or typically) have a 
beneficiary. It must be useful for, beneficial for, or otherwise represent a "good" for some 
agent or system. This type of teleology is fairly evident in the world of artifacts, because 
artifacts are produced for a purpose and hence for an end deemed useful or beneficial 
by someone. Consequently, the good-contribution view is closely associated with the 
mentalistic view described above. However, this doctrine is not identical with mental-
ism, because it is not incoherent to ascribe "interests" or "goods" to biological entities 
that cannot be said to possess the sort of mental life required by mentalism. 
Canfield (1964), for example, defines the function of an entity simply as some useful 
contribution it makes to a system: "A function of I (inS) is to doC means I does C and 
that Cis done is useful to S" (ibid., p.290). In the biological context, he argues, the 
"usefulness" of a trait can be identified with its making a contribution to the survival 
or reproductive capacity of its bearer (ibid., p.292). Sorabji (1964) also expounds a 
good-contribution theory, and he argues that Plato and Aristotle hold this view. Ayala 
( 19 70) amends his etiological analysis by incorporating the concept of "utility" into his 
account: a feature of a system is "teleological" if it possesses "utility for the system in 
which it exists and such utility explains the presence of the feature in the system" (ibid., 
p.45). Thus, although strictly speaking, Ayala's position is an etiological one, it also 
incorporates the concept of benefit. Bedau (e.g., 1991, 1992, 1993) is the most 
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prominent current defender of the good-contribution theory; also see McLaughlin 
(2001; especially chapter 8) for a recent defense ofthe view that any adequate theory 
of function must incorporate such a "welfare" provision. 
Presumably, one of the main advantages of such a view is that it appears to bridge 
the divide between natural functions and artifact functions, for, whereas artifact func-
tions are "useful" by virtue of conscious design, natural functions are "useful" by virtue 
of their fitness contribution. In other words, the same concept is instantiated differently 
depending on the context, and hence there is no deep conceptual divergence between 
the usages. Moreover, as Bedau (1992) points out, this solution would resolve some of 
the Boorse-style counterexamples described in relation to the etiological view - for 
example, the stick that is pinned to the rock because of the backwash it creates does 
not have the "function" of creating the backwash, and that is because being pinned to 
the rock is not "good for anything" (ibid., p. 78 7). 
However, a significant problem with the good-contribution view is that it does not 
allow functions to be distinguished from "fortuitous benefits" or "lucky accidents." 
Frankfurt and Poole ( 19 6 5 ), for example, criticize Canfield ( 19 64) because heart sounds 
sometimes do have good consequences for fitness by alerting a physician to a potential 
life-threatening ailment, yet it does not have this as a function. (Wright, 19 73, pp.145-
6 and Bedau, 1992, p.787 also raise this problem.) One solution to this would be to 
incorporate a statistical component: in order to have a function, the activity in question 
must usually, or typically, contribute to some good. But as Millikan (1984, p.29) 
famously points out, statistical normalcy is not a reliable guide to functionality, since 
the probability that a given sperm will actually fertilize an egg is extremely low, yet 
fertilization is without doubt the function of sperm. Most sperm are quite literally good 
for nothing. Finally, of course, accepting something like the good-contribution view 
would most likely spell the death of the project of "naturalizing teleology," since the 
ascription of function would be explicitly value-relative, and values are notoriously 
difficult to situate within the natural world. 
Bedau (1992, p.794), like Ayala (1970), suggests the possibility of a theory of bio-
logical teleology that conjoins the etiological view and the good consequence view and 
that would amelio~ate the problem offortuitous benefits. According to this view, a trait 
would come to possess a function because its persistence is partly explained by its past 
contribution to a beneficial consequence (e.g., (ncreased fitness). However, he does not go 
so far as to offer an unqualified endorsement of this view, since the goodness of the result 
(increased fitness) does not itself perform an essential explanatory role in the etiology 
of the trait, but is only, as it were, externally linked to that explanation (ibid., pp.801-
2). McLaughlin (2001), however, develops a similar view according to which, in order 
to have a function, a trait must have produced a beneficial consequence that contrib-
uted to its own persistence or reproduction (ibid., p.168). 
3.4. Fitness-contribution theories 
The basic, unqualified idea behind fitness-contribution theories is that the function of 
a trait consists in its contribution to the fitness of the organism (or, more generally, to 
the fitness of the biological system of which it is a part). Thus, according to this view, 
the ascription of a function to a trait does not explain why that trait currently exists, 
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although ascription of a function to ancestral tokens of a trait can play a role in an 
explanation for the current persistence of that trait. Fitness-contribution views are 
proposed by Canfield (1964), Lehman (1965), Ruse (1971, 1973), Bechtel (1986), 
Bigelow and Pargetter (1987), Horan (1989), Walsh (1996), and Wouters (2003, 
2005) (although, as pointed out above, Canfield (1964) accepts this view insofar as he 
defines "function" in terms of utility and believes that the fitness contribution made by 
a trait is "useful" to the organism). Sarkar (2005, p.18) presents a generalization of 
this view, according to which a part of a system must merely contribute to the persis-
tence of its containing system in order to have a function, and not necessarily to the 
reproduction of that system. This would allow functions to be assigned to the parts of, 
e.g., sterile organisms. 
One problem with this unqualified view is that, in principle, fitness assignments can 
vary wildly depending upon fluctuations in the current environment, but function 
assignments tend to be relatively stable. For example, one can create an abnormal, 
transient environment in which a trait that is usually maladaptive possesses survival 
value, but it seems counterintuitive to say that the trait comes to possess a new function 
in that environment. Moreover, even traits that are, on average, adaptive in a given 
environment can, in certain environments, become maladaptive. But it is not said that 
in such an environment the trait no longer has a function, but that it is unable to 
perform its function. 
Such counterexamples suggest that such function ascriptions should be relativized 
to a "normal" or "average"' environment, in order to exclude abnormal or transient 
ones. This recognition led Bigelow and Pargetter (1987) to propose that a trait has a 
function when it bestows a survival-enhancing propensity on the organism that pos-
sesses it, in that organism's natural habitat (ibid., p.192). Thus, their definition of 
function introduces a counterfactual element - if the trait were in its natural habitat, 
then it would, ceteris paribus, contribute to the fitness of its bearer. Yet this introduces 
further problems. Obviously, the "natural habitat" for an organism is not necessarily 
the organism's current habitat. But if not, then what constitutes an organism's natural 
habitat? One candidate for the natural habitat of an organism is that habitat in which 
it has, historically, flourished (Millikan, 1989b, p.300; Mitchell, 1993, pp.258-9; 
Godfrey-Smith, 1994, p.352; Walsh, 1996, p.562). But then the propensity theory of 
functions is rendered perilously close to some version of the etiological theory, since its 
incorporation of a historical component violates the spirit of the "forward-looking" 
view they endorse. Walsh (1996; also see Walsh & Ariew, 1996) attempts to eliminate 
the problem of defining the organism's "natural habitat" by proposing a relational 
theory of function, according to which the function statement must be relativized to a 
specific "selective regime," which may have occurred in the past or the present. Hence, 
in his view, there are no functions simpliciter; in order to assign a function one must 
state precisely the nature of the environment within which the trait contributes to 
fitness. 
A similar problem stems from the following consideration. In order to estimate the 
contribution of a trait to fitness, one must compare the average fitness of organisms 
that possess the trait with the average fitness of those that do not. But if no variation 
for that trait currently exists-such as the human lmeecap- then it is not clear what to 
compare its performance with (Frankfurt & Poole, 1965, pp.71-2; Wimsatt, 1972, 
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pp.SS-61; Millikan, 1989a; Godfrey Smith, 1994, p.352). One possibility would be to 
compare it with the variation that existed at an earlier time. But again, this brings the 
propensity theory closer in spirit to the etiological view. 
Wouters (2003, 2005) proposes a version of the fitness-contribution view according 
to which, in order to have a function, a trait must confer a biological advantage upon 
its possessor, relative to some actual or counterfactual set of variants. This resolves the 
problem insofar as one must explicitly stipulate the range of variation in question. 
Moreover, he argues that this reflects standard practice within some fields of biology. 
In optimality models of adaptation, for example, the relevant range of alternatives (the 
"phenotype set") is typically derived from biologically informed assumptions about 
what is physically, ecologically, or physiologically possible (Parker & Maynard Smith, 
1990, p.27; also see Wouters, 2005, p.43). However, merely stipulating the range of 
variants in question seems to introduce an element of arbitrariness into function ascrip-
tions. Relative to one hypothetical set of variants, a trait has a function; relative to 
another set, it does not. Clearly, something more substantive should be said about how 
this range of variation can be non-arbitrarily determined. 
As noted above, the main advantage of contribution-based theories is that they are 
more consistent with the majority of biological usage. Moreover, given the difficulty of 
inferring the evolutionary history of a trait from its current activity, it makes the prac-
tice of ascribing functions much more amenable to empirical testing. However, these 
theories appear to deprive functions of two of the properties that have, historically, been 
associated with their use and that continue to be associated with them. The first is the 
notion that they are explanatory in the sense that they specify an efficient cause for the 
current existence of the trait. What this means is not that the fact that a trait had a 
function in the past explains its current existence, but a trait's having a function explains 
its current existence. The second is that they are normative. On the etiological view, 
the distinction between functioning properly, malfunctioning, ahd inability to function 
due to an abnormal environment is rendered tolerably clear: because 'of the fact that 
function is a historical concept, something can have a function without being able to 
perform it. It is controversial whether these distinctions can be drawn clearly within 
consequentialist theories, though it has been argued that consequentialist views can 
sustain normative interpretations of function (Wimsatt, 1972, p.47; Walsh, 1996, 
p.568; Schlosser, 1998, p.327). 
Such considerations reinforce the value of adopting a pluralistic and context-
dependent approach to analyzing "function." In other words, in order to evaluate the 
meaning of a particular usage of "function" in a biological context, one must first iden,-
tify the particular explanatory or pragmatic context in which that usage is embedded. 
If, for example, the ascription is intended to support an inference about how a trait 
evolved, or, perhaps, to make a normative claim about how the trait ought to behave, 
then an etiological concept of function may be implied. Alternatively, if the ascription 
is intended to sketch a prediction about the future survival value of a trait, or simply a 
prediction about what sort of behavior one ought to expect the trait to produce under 
well-d~fined circumstances, then a fitness-contribution "theory, or an interest-based 
view, may be sufficient. What is crucial, then, is that different concepts of function 
allow one to articulate precisely the ontological and epistemological commitments that 
are implied by a given usage, and to ensure either that those commitments are satisfied 
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in that context, or that the conditions under which the function ascription would be 
warranted can be explicitly stated. 
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